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Revisiting the phenomenon of sound as
"empty container":
The acoustic imagination in Kurt Schwitters's
Ursonata
Abstract:
Dadaist artist and composer Kurt Schwitters’s
Ursonata (1922-1932) is a sound poem for solo
voice based on a made-up verbal language that
uses phonetics in German. Percussionist Steven
Schick and composer/sound designer Shahrokh
Yadegari have arranged a multimedia
interpretation of Ursonata, (The New) UrSonata
(2006) that amplifies the sounds of the voice as
spatiotemporal events. Addressing the
spatiotemporal voice in the (The New) UrSonata,
this paper raises two goals: (1) to unfold the
perception and reception of sound as acoustic
imagination, and (2) to discuss acoustic
imagination as “empty container” in Henri
Lefebvre’s terms, that generates spatiality and
bodily thought.
To examine the notion of acoustic imagination, I
will refer to Henri Lefebvre’s metaphor of
“empty container”, which indicates a pure
interiority to be filled in. Lefebvre qualifies the
ontological status of space as empty container. I
intend to use the same metaphor to formulate
acoustic imagination. I will elaborate the
connection between “empty container” and
acoustic imagination by exemplifying the sounds
of a coffee machine. Imagine the rhythmic drops
of a coffee machine. Listening to the drops, we
resonate with the sounds, we map a space
through the physical nexus of the sounds, and we
orient ourselves within the actual space by the
help of the sounds. In other words, being
physically and psychically extended by the
sound, we draw a space. Acoustic imagination is
pure interiority filled with such extension. This
very extension produces spatial thought. In his
Phenomenology of Perception, Maurice
Merleau-Ponty draws our attention to spatiality
as ‘bodily thought”. Furthering Merleau-Ponty’s
idea, I will suggest that acoustic imagination
constitutes bodily thought.
I will then return to Schwitter’s Ursonata and
(The New) UrSonata, and situate the
spatiotemporal sounds of the voice at the heart of
our listening experience. While listening to
crystallized fragments of sound, how do we
conceive Schick’s voice? How do we hear,
imagine, and build symmetries or asymmetries
between his voice and our own voices?
Introduction
How do we receive sound? How do we
process it? And what happens after? Looking at
the reception of sound closely, this paper argues
acoustic imagination as one’s physical and
psychic extension that generates space and
bodily thought. I will first address the notion of
spatiality referring to Henri Lefebvre’s notion of
space. Lefebvre uses the metaphor of “empty
container” to describe the ontological status of
space. I will use the same metaphor to suggest
the physical and psychic operation of sound. The
geometrical nexus of sound creates physical
space. Based on embodied resonance, the
perception of sound leads to a psychic space.
This highlights the notion of space as “bodily
thought.”  I will then refer to Maurice Merleau-
Ponty’s notion of spatiality, which draws our
attention to the dynamically intrinsic conjunction
between spatiality and bodily thought. Pursuing
Lefebvre’s “empty container” metaphor, I will
further Merleau-Ponty’s reading on “living
body” in his Phenomenology of Perception.
I will examine my argument by
focusing on the sound poem, Ursonata (1922-
32), written by Dadaist composer and artist Kurt
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Schwitters for voice, based on a made-up verbal
language that uses the phonetics in German. The
made-up language of phonemes constitutes a site
of struggle between sense and non-sense.
However, when the performer “speaks” and
“acts” through the phonemes, the listener
communicates with the piece. Vocalization of
phonemes – which do not necessarily resolve
into a meaningful word – forces the audience’s
acoustic imagination. To crystallize such
acoustic imagination, I will address a recent
interpretation of Ursonata, (The New) UrSonata
(2006), composed by American percussionist
Steven Schick and the sound designer Shahrokh
Yadegari.
(The New) UrSonata is a combination
of live vocal performance and live electronics.
Schick’s live voice collaborates with Yadegari’s
special sound design created with four channel
spatialization and analog processes such as loop,
ring modulation and feedback. The particular
dialogue between live and processed voice
amplifies, extends, repeats, and punctuates the
phonemes as the fragments of the voice. With
such interruption, the audience is encouraged to
hear the fragments of Schick’s voice as
spatiotemporal sound events that generate
acoustic imagination. By focusing on these
spatiotemporal events, I will argue spatial
thought as “physical and psychic” extension, and
sound as the stimulator of such extension.
Revisiting the phenomenon of sound: “empty
container”
By acoustic imagination, I indicate a
spatial thought. Sound physically orients certain
geometry, creates density and volume. When we
hear sounds, our bodies resonate with that sound.
The movement of sound constructs our
conception of space. This feeling of space is an
organic condition of responding to sound. How
do phonemes encourage such a spatial thought?
Lets imagine other sounds that are not bounded
by discursive language to answer this question,
coffee machine sound for instance. What kind of
a spatial thought does coffee machine deliver?
A coffee machine breathes deeply and
loudly. The rhythmic drops increase the tension
of the water. They create a dynamic texture
through which the whole room resonates with
the drops. The room is breathing deeply and
loudly with the coffee machine. The room is
open to a new space with the coffee machine’s
sound. Its inaudible noise has become audible
with the coffee machine’s sound. Each time I
hear its sound, each time I feel somewhere else.
The coffee machine’s multiple sounds and drops
each time encourage a new map for a new space.
Hearing the coffee machine’s sound,
and mapping a certain space through it, indicates
virtual architecture. Virtual architecture here
refers to the liquid and invisible transitions
between limits, between signs, between words. A
virtual architecture provides an open site, a
vulnerable valley for unexpected beings. How
does sound suggest a virtual architecture? The
physicality of sound enables sound to suggest a
virtual architecture. Sound is temporal, spatial,
liquid, and transient. Sound is itself an acoustic
space before it becomes a mental image or a
signifier. Sound itself pushes the very idea of
space as an empty inside, an “empty container.”
Henri Lefebvre uses the metaphor of
“empty container,” while discussing the notion
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of space. Lefebvre posits the “ontological status”
of space tracing the classical philosophical
thought back1: Spinoza defined space as
“absolute” and “substantial”, which reflects an
absolute being. Challenging the “absolute,”
Leibniz reformulated space as “indiscernible.”2
Leibniz’s “indiscernible” space is problematic.
Lefebvre hints at this problem with his
discussion about the possibilities of space: (1)
available and (2) occupied. A space has to be
“occupied.” A space can only become
“discernible”, if it is “occupied.” A space is
subject to being occupied. Then what is
“indiscernible?”3 What makes a space occupied,
and “discernible?” Lefebvre suggests an answer
to this question: “A body.”4
But before his suggestion, we need to
consider the act of occupying further. Occupying
indicates two axes: weight and height, through
which a set of movements – extending,
expanding, and stretching– can be pursued. The
set of movements bring the state of “filling in.”
Before “filling in,” a space is only a potential, an
empty inside, a capacity for movement, and a
pure interiority. Is this statement assuming an
“absolute” space, or a “space in itself” again?
Not necessarily. An absolute space is self-
sufficient. Here I do not refer to self-sufficiency.
On the contrary, I refer to self-dependency: an
empty container is “available” for set of actions,
set of movements that would fill the emptiness
not in an abstract way, but in a very concrete
way of abstraction.
Lefebvre explicitly opposes the idea of
positing space as a “pre-existing void” that can
only be measured with its “formal properties.”5
Returning to his suggestion, only “a body” can
fill in a space. What Lefebvre means by “body”
does not simply mark “human body,” but also
marks an operating body – fragment– of a larger
whole with certain gestures and directions:
A body - not bodies in general, nor
corporeality, but a specific body, a body
capable of indicating direction by a
gesture, of defining rotation by turning
around, of demarcating and orienting
space.6
Accordingly, a body is an informative limit, a
separation, a difference. It is in that sense a
fragment. It is in that sense incomplete, and open
to engineering. Its surface and depth are
dependent and limited, but infinite with the
existence and transcendence of another fragment.
One fragment would extend another fragment’s
height, expand its weight, stretches its substance,
and fill its emptiness. Sound is a fragment, a
body of this kind.
Phenomenology of sound deals with
sound of being. Sound is not immanent, not self-
sufficient. The incompleteness of sound verifies
how contextual it is. Sounds come into existence
as sounds of something, of somewhere, of
somebody. They find their body with our
intentionality, with our capacity of
transcendence. As a physical phenomenon, it is
an empty space. A hopeful spot this is: potential.
Sound encourages the set of movements I
mentioned above. The movements would occupy
sound’s potential, whereby sound produces a
certain space.
Like the movements of the water drops.
The water drops of the coffee machine operate as
overlapping fragments. Each fragment’s sound
produces the space of each water drop. The space
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of the water drop expands with the sound. The
space of the coffee machine extends with the
sonic texture.  Ursonata’s phonemes interact
with each other in a similar way. Each phoneme
is a sonorous body, a fragment that needs
another fragment.
Acoustic Imagination in (The New) UrSonata:
The phonemes of Ursonata  are not
pitch, tempo, or meter defined. The vocalization
of phonemes renders oral articulation a site of
struggle. In his performance, Steven Schick
appropriates this struggle through the modes of
repetition, punctuation, and intensification (i.e.
with dynamics, such as loud and aggressive, soft
and silent etc.). The frequency of phonemes like
“bee,” “wee,” “tee,” becomes recognizable
sections through these processes, for instance.
Each section functions like a punctuated pattern,
becoming “groups of sounds.” The sound design
here functions to crystallize and amplify these
groups of sounds. The electronic process creates
the sound mirror of the live voice, not simply by
explicitly creating an alter voice by live
processing, but also by stimulating a bodily
sensation based on sound, which is uniquely
personal arriving at one’s own voice. (The New)
UrSonata thereby helps us revisit the operation
of both physical and phenomenal sound behind
verbal thought.
Julia Kristeva, in her book, Language
The Unknown, sketches how phonemes are
united with each other, and function as “groups
of sounds.”7 Similarly, here phonemes like dll
rrrrr beeeee bö function as a group that is
vocalized with a continuous motion. Phonemes
are interdependent, and cannot be separated from
each other, due to the liquid nature of sound, as
discussed above. As Walter Ong posits, “Sound
exists only when it is going out of
existence…When I pronounce the word
‘permanence,’ by the time I get to the ‘-nence,’
the ‘perma-’is gone, and has to be gone.”8  In
short, the very being of sound is not an
intangible presence, but a tangible absence.
Then, phonemes, as groups of sounds,
cannot provide a coherent unity, either physically
or conceptually. Involved in the vocalization of
the word, phone is before and after the word.
Instead of fixing, it opens the word. Phonemes
do not hold the word together; on the contrary
they make the word vulnerable, slippery, and
dynamic. Sound does not allow the word to
become a whole. As Ong argues, the meaning
becomes multiplied through the medium of
orality, as ‘empathetic and participatory rather
than objectively distanced, situational rather than
abstract.”9 The contingent quality of orality
derives from the very medium of orality: human
voice as sets of sound affairs.
Through the extended and amplified
phonemes, the made-up language of (The New)
UrSonata is then not a completely alien
language, but a potential to build a language that
is involved in “here and now”, that can speak
through “here and now”, that needs the “facial
gestures, vocal inflections, entire human,
existential setting in which the real, spoken word
always occurs,” as Ong claims. This quality











Schick’s facial gestures in almost every
movement of the piece encourage the audience to
hear the bodily exertion of sound, and bodily
sounds as situational moments of his voice.
There is no given meaning, no default resolution
in Schick’s expression. Just like coffee
machine’s sound – being repeated without a
certain narrative, without a certain melody –
phonemes become rhythmic and multiple on the
one hand, remain empty, incomplete, and
situational, on the other. The technological
means – spatialization, modulation and feedback
– echoes these spatiotemporal events, and thus,
brings awareness to our ears, to hearing the
texture of embodied sound.
Here I would like to remind Maurice
Merleau-Ponty’s discussion on “living body.” In
his Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-
Ponty suggests the human body as an active
interface that bridges the inside to the outside.
He encourages us to ask how our bodies
continually are extended to the external world,
becoming a kind of “body” that Lefebvre posits
on the one hand, and how this operation itself
becomes specific, building a unique corporeality,
and thus becoming different from the other
external bodies, on the other:
I cannot understand the function of the
living body except by enacting it
myself, and except in so far as I am a
body which rises towards the world.
Thus exteroceptivity demands that
stimuli be given a shape; the
consciousness of the body invades the
body, the soul spreads over all its parts,
                                                 
and behaviour overspills its central
factor. But one might reply that this
“bodily experience” is itself a
‘representation’, a ‘psychic act’, and
that as such it is at the end of a chain of
physical and physiological events which
alone can be ascribed to the ‘real body’.
Is not my body, exactly as are external
bodies, and object which acts on
receptors and finally gives rise to the
consciousness of the body? Is there not
an “introceptivity” just as there is an
‘exteroceptivity’?11
In this passage, Merleau Ponty intertwines the
“psychic” and “physical” operation of the body.
The body is a receptor. It absorbs the external
stimuli, and echoes back. But it also reflects the
external stimuli in a particular way, due to its
own “inside” that is its own – already existing –
accumulation. What does this passage tell us
about sound as the site of intertwined inside and
outside? Though not explicitly, the process of
absorbing and echoing back the outside hints the
operation of sound, which I addressed above.
Sound makes the transition possible between
inside and outside, by physically and psychically
extending the human body. This is how its
“reciprocal basis” leads to “indefinite
multiplicities.”12
The “indefinite multiplicities” of sound
is embedded in tactility, in embodied resonance.
The question is how sound’s touching maps “a
spatiality of situation.”13 Touching indicates not
“pinpointing,” but “grasping” as Merleau Ponty
reminds us. By situation, I intend to use the
literal meaning of the word: a set of affairs.
Instead of one single location, sound creates a set
of affairs or/and positions. And set of affairs
brings about the notion of space. Relating to a
space, sound maps the spatiality of situation.
Here, it is necessary to mention Merleau Ponty’s
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remarks on spatiality again, since Merleau Ponty
differentiates body’s spatiality from other
external objects’ spatiality. Unlike other external
objects, “Bodily space can envelop its parts
instead of spreading them out.”14
Similar to Merleau Ponty, Jean Luc
Nancy interprets bodily space as a separate
envelope. Derrida, in his book, On Touching-
Jean Luc Nancy, articulates how Nancy qualifies
touching as a condition that derives from the
existence of limit. Suggesting psyche as a
“spatial extension,” Nancy necessitates
“touching” as a possibility of extending,
transcending the limit, or “sharing.” Derrida
paraphrases Nancy’s suggestion:
To touch is to touch a limit, a surface, a
border, an outline. Even if one touches
an inside, “inside” of anything
whatsoever, one does it following the
point, the line or surface, the borderline
of a spatiality exposed to the outside,
offered…15
Transcending the limit, or “grasping inside” does
not renounce the limit then. Even though Nancy
situates touching as a potential for spatial
extension, he does not formulate a point beyond
or after-limit. He only proposes “imagination” as
a “transcendental schema” or “sensible
presentation.” Nancy’s conception of touching
and touching a limit is thereby synonymous with
“imagination.”16
This explanation of touching is
suggestive to understand how (The New)
UrSonata constructs both imaginary and physical
bodies as limit, as sets of crystallized sounds.
This also helps us perceive the possibility of
extension between these crystallized sounds. We
hear them separately and together. Schick’s body
is a separable envelope, but when his voice
touches us, it grasps our inside, and finds its
place in our bodies, in our envelope. Voice, then,
as a bodily space, can only be Lefebvre’s “empty
container,” or a space as connection, as Merleau
Ponty proposes. And being enforced to hear
Schick’s voice as sets of sounds through the
spatialization, amplification, and modulation of
phonemes, we become aware of our own
embodied resonance, hearing our own bodily
rhythm and texture.
Rhythm highlights the texture,
“gestures” and “directions” in Lefebvre’s words.
Rhythmic units are spatiotemporal fragments,
which would enable us to “discern” a space, and
its occupying “bodies.” Listening to the
fragments – the phonemes – we enter the
process, the depth generated with the interaction
of the bodies. Listening to (The New) UrSonata
then motivates a “spatial” thinking, and thinking
of “spatiality.” “…Spatial thought began
reproducing the projection, explosion, image,
and orientation of the body,”17 writes Lefebvre.
Here I suggest that “spatial thought,” is an
“acoustic imagination” of hearing one’s own
body.
Conclusion
This paper can be considered a sketch
that draws the vivid intersections between spatial
thought, bodily space, and acoustic imagination.
Why is it necessary to draw such lines? Because,
we need to revisit what acoustic imagination
offers us. Acoustic imagination is the way we
receive sounds. It is not simply the mechanical
perception of auditory stimulus. It is how we
physically and psychically extend ourselves to
the external world through sound.
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We take sounds for granted. Sound,
however, envelops our bodies like a blanket.
Physically and psychically, extending our
bodies, it creates a liquid interface between self
and its other. This is why we need to revisit the
sensory, cognitive, and phenomenal aspects of
what sound does to us.
 This essay attempted to address these
aspects, encourage us to further the process of
listening, and finding its foundation as
imagination.
NOTES
                                                 
1 In his “Spatial Architectonics”, Lefebvre
begins his exploration about the notion of
space with Spinoza’s Ethics: “Having
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abstraction, classical philosophical (or
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unknowable?” Henri Lefebvre, “Spatial
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trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Oxford,
Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1991), 169.
2 Ibid., 169.
3 Lefebvre reads Leibniz as such: “In order
to discern ‘something’ therein, axes and an
origin must be introduced, and a right and
left, i.e. the direction or orientation of those
axes. This does not mean, however, that
Leibniz espouses the ‘subjectivist’ thesis
according to which the observer and the
measure together constitute the real. To the
contrary, what Leibniz means to say is that it
                                                                   
is necessary for space to be occupied”.
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71.
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14 Ibid., 100.
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